PNP THREE-TIERED DEFENSE SYSTEM, Terrorism 

This study aimed to assess certain provisions of the Handbook of PNP Manual
Three-tiered Defense System. The respondents were the police-officers of the Negros
Oriental Police Provincial Office and the member of Peace and Order Council of the
Province of Negros Oriental. It presented the assessment of the respondents on the
provisions of the Handbook of PNP Manual Three-tiered Defense System in terms of
intelligence, target hardening and incident management. It also evaluated the significant
difference between the assessments of the two groups of respondents on the provisions
of the Handbook on PNP Manual Three-Tiered Defense System. It presented the

changes the can be proposed on the Handbook on PNP Manual Three-Tiered Defense
System. The significant difference between the assessments of the two (2) groups of
respondents on the proposed changes on the Handbook on PNP Manual Three-Tiered
Defense System relative to the variables were also assessed. It also presented the
manual revisions from the findings of the study.
The respondents assessed the Handbook on PNP Manual Three-Tiered Defense
System Against Terrorism in terms of intelligence, as highly relevant with a grand mean
of 4.34. The highest indicator with an average weighted mean of 4.55 or highly relevant
was the Conduct of public awareness and education efforts on the terrorist and the
bomb. This implied that in order to avoid the dangers brought by terrorism and bombing,
the public must know about and be prepared for them. Also highly relevant with an
average weighted mean of 4.54 was the identification of potential terrorist targets
(examples: vital installations; malls; power lines, etc.). Terrorist did not just target any
structures. They target the ones which could cripple the economy or the peaceful lives
of the community members. Identification of terrorist organizations/profile (examples: Al
Qaeda, Abu Sayyaf) was also highly relevant with 4.34.
Two indicators were assessed as only relevant: Conduct of pre-emptive strikes
on terrorist lairs to disrupt violent plans and Organizations of the LGEs of their own
intelligence network. These had average weighted means of 4.13 and 4.12,
respectively. These implied that further must be done to these provisions to make them
highly relevant.
The findings indicated that for anti-terrorism to be effective, the intelligence
capacity must be able to identify the terrorist lair such that pre-emptive strikes could be
done. In making this further effective, it is not only the local PNP units that must be
organized but also the local government executives. A two-pronged intelligence
organization will have the netter chance of pre-empting terrorism than just putting all the
responsibilities to the police forces.
The police officers of the Negros Oriental Police Provincial Office and the Peace
and Order Council Members assessed the Handbook on PNP Manual Three-Tiered
Defense System Against Terrorism, in terms of target hardening as highly relevant with
a grand mean of 4.60 or highly relevant was Enhancement of physical and personnel
security measures. This implied that for target of terrorism to be hardened, the target
which were persons and physical structures must be secured properly such that terrorist
would have hard times aiming at them.
Among the indicators, the lowest was Media Management with an average
weighted mean of 3.93. This implied the need to revise the manual on this aspect.
The respondents assessed the Handbook on PNP Manual Three-Tiered Defense
System Against Terrorism, in terms if incident management, as relevant with a grand
mean of 4.17.
The indicator with the highest average weighted mean of 4.34 or highly relevant
was the Activation of the Crisis Management Committee; activation of the On-Scene
Command Post. This implied that when terrorist attacks occurred, it was highly relevant
to have a committee activated for that specific crisis. Furthermore, the capability of the
PNP as the barriers to terrorist could be observed in their setting up of ON-Scene
Command Post.

The first two indicators were only assessed as relevant, both attaining average
weighted means of 4.09. Thus, this implied the need to improve on the procedure of the
Local Government Executives (LGEs) shall exercise authority and provide direction,
control and supervision in the conduct of operations. This put into question whether the
local government executives or the police officers should be leading Incident
Management. The indicator Activation of private Crisis Management Team (CMT) if
practicable, under the incident manager to initially handle the incident prior to the arrival
of the Crisis Management Committee was also in question since anti-terrorism activities
were mainly the domain of the police and/or military institutions, both of which were
public entities.
All of the computed F-values for intelligence, target hardening and incident
management were lower than the critical F-value. The computed F-values were 3.42,
0.001 and 1.46. The F-value was set at 3.87. Therefore, there was no significant
difference in the assessments of the respondents on the Handbook on PNP Manual
Three-Tiered Defense System Against Terrorism, in terms of intelligence, target
hardening and incident management. For the three variables, the results showed
consistent answers from both groups. It implied that the strategies made by the Negros
Oriental PPO and the Peace and Order Councils were both coordinated to repel any
terrorist attacks in Negros Oriental. This also implied that they deemed the provisions of
the Handbook on PNP Manual Three-Tiered Defense System Against Terrorism as
highly relevant or relevant in its provisions.
The respondents assessed the proposed changed on the Handbook on PNP
Manual Three-Tiered Defense System Against Terrorism, in terms of intelligence as
highly recommended with a grand mean of 4.54. The indicator with the highest average
weighted mean of 4.73 was on Identification of potential terrorist targets (examples: vital
installations, malls; power lines; etc.), and other targets crucial to the community like
water supply and food supply routes, Vigilance was required on these vital aspects such
as the water supply and food supply routes.
The indicator Conduct of public awareness and education efforts on the terrorist
and the bomb in schools, public plaza and even inside the churches obtained highly
recommended interpretation. Also highly recommended were the Employing full-time
personnel for Intelligence Activities (4.48); and Conduct of pre-emptive strikes and
intelligence takeover on terrorist lairs to disrupt violent plans (4.34). These proposed
changes implied the need for public education is as many places as possible, the need
for full-time intelligence personnel; and the need to do proactive intelligence attacks
against terrorist lairs.
The respondents assessed the proposed changes on the Handbook on PNP
Manual Three-Tiered Defense System Against Terrorism, in terms of target hardening,
as highly recommended with a grand mean of 4.44. The proposal on the indicator
Enhancement of community partnerships to increase awareness, preparation, action
plans and to mobilize the community in the form of rondas, civilian volunteers, etc.
obtained the highest average weighted mean of 4.57. Thus target hardening must be
based on community actions.
Also highly recommended was the Enhancement of physical and personnel
security measures to facilitate that and persons who are high-value targets with an
average weighted mean of 4.56 or highly recommended. The other highly

recommended changes on target hardening were Conduct of rehearsals/drills/dry runs
to keep the PNP always ready for protecting targets and response to emergencies and
Convening of the Crisis Management Committee (CMC) to monitor the threat, make
preparations to prevent and immediately neutralize it.
The proposed change on Media Management where intelligence information on
terrorist shall be withheld from the public was only assessed as recommended with an
AWM of 4.15. Thus, there was a need to further revise the section on Media
Management.
The police officers of the Negros Oriental Police Provincial office and the
members of Negros Oriental Peace and Order Council assessed the proposed changes
on the handbook on PNP Three-Tiered Defense System against Terrorism, in terms of
incident management as highly relevant with a grand mean of 4.45. The revision with
the highest average weighted mean of 4.45 or highly recommended was Activation of
the Crisis Management Committee; activation of the On-Scene Command Post, with the
OSCP advising the CMC on what immediate actions should be done. This implied that
proper coordination procedures between OSCP and CMC be established in times of
crisis.
The other two highly recommended manual revisions further specified
procedures on incident management. These were the Local Government Executives
(LGEs) shall exercise authority and provide direction, control and supervision in the
conduct of operations. However, all actions shall be based on the outputs of full-time
intelligence assets. And the other was Activation of private Crisis Management Team
(CMT) if practicable, under the incident manager to initially handle the incident prior to
the arrival of the Crisis Management Committee. Such private Crisis Management
Team shall be composed of individuals with extensive training that, also report to the
CMC.
The computed F-values were 2.64 for intelligence, 0.32 for target hardening and
2.69 for incident management. The critical F-value was 3.87. The acceptance of the null
hypothesis led to the conclusion that there was no significant difference in the
assessments of the respondents on the proposed changes in the Handbook on PNP
Manual Three-Tiered Defense System Against Terrorism, in terms of intelligence, target
hardening, and incident management.
Based on the results of the study, the following can be concluded: The police
officers of the Negros Oriental Police Provincial Office and the peace and order council
members of Negros Oriental assessed the Handbook on PNP Manual Three-Tiered
Defense System Against Terrorism as highly relevant. Improvement in several areas
through manual revision were found out, however to indicators with lowest average
weighted means such as organization of the local government executives of their own
intelligence network, and conducting pre-emptive strikes on terrorist lairs, in terms of
intelligence. For target hardening, there was a need to improve media management. In
incident management, the Handbook was found out to have lowest assessment in the
conduct of operations by the Local Government Executives, and activation of Crisis
Management Team. The police officers of the Negros Oriental PPO and the POC
members have the same perspectives on the PNP Three-Tiered Defense System
against terrorism as highly relevant against terrorism in terms of intelligence, target
hardening and incident management. The changes that can be proposed on the PNP

Three-Tiered Defense System against Terrorism as highly relevant against terrorism in
terms of intelligence, target hardening and incident management. The changes that can
be proposed on the PNP Three-Tiered Defense System against terrorism are assessed
as highly recommended in identification of potential terrorist targets and other targets
crucial to the community like water supply and food supply routes; enhancement of
community partnerships to increase awareness, preparation action plans and to
mobilize the community in the form of rondas, civilian volunteer, etc.; and activation of
the Crisis Management Committee; activation of the On-scene Command Post, with the
OSCP advising the CMC on what immediate actions should be done. The respondents
have similar views on the changes that can be proposed on the PNP Three-Tiered
Defense Systems against terrorism. The manual revisions on the PNP Three-Tiered
Defense System against terrorism is composed of all the proposed changes to it.
Based on the conclusions of the study, the following are the recommendations:
Re-evaluation of the contents of the Handbook on PNP Manual Three-Tiered Defense
System Against Terrorism can be proposed for enhancement. These contents cover the
aspects of organization of the local government executives of their own intelligence
network, conducting pre-emptive strikes on terrorist lairs, media management, and
activation of Crisis Management Council. The Negros Oriental Police Provincial Office
needs to increase its intelligence capability by recruiting full-time intelligence assets.
This can be done by selecting areas with the highest threats of terrorism. Recruits must
undergo the necessary intelligence training, with priority given to those who know the
area and the environment. The police office also needs to identify high-value target for
terrorists, even if terrorism was not that rampant in the area. Target hardening activities
like police patrols and the community vigilance may be set-up in these installations or
structures. Public education against terrorism may be conducted by the Negros Oriental
Police Provincial Office in as many places as possible. This may be conducted in
schools, market places, churches and barangay halls. The NOPPO needs to establish a
Crisis Management Council such that the police authorities and the civilians could come
up with procedures during the time of terroristic attacks. The Crisis Management
Council must have established procedures to be followed during acts of terrors. Results
of this study may be proposed to be considered for adoption to higher PNP authorities
for consideration.